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THE ETHICS OF CONVENTION AND THE ETHICS OF NATURE 
by 
RICHARD TAYLOR 
I want to begin this discussion with an account of a mythical race qf people 
called muhans. These muhan people are much like us in most respects-they en­
joy watching television, drive automobiles, anguish over fuel shortages and environ­
mental pollution, choose their governments by free elections, have a system of soc­
fal security, and so on. The only natural difference between these people a n d  
ourselves is that they are not distinguished by sex-which is why they are called 
muhans, instead of humans. They are all of one sex or, better, there are no dis­
tinctions of sex at all, and the concept itself has no place in their thinking. They 
are all just alike. 
Each muhan has, accordingly, but one parent, and one such parent together 
with offspring is quite naturally considered a family. Vast areas of life are simpler 
among the muhans than with us. Ancestry is linear and easily grasped. Divorce is 
unheard of, there are no family courts, no domestic quarrels of the more familiar 
kind, no problems of male domination or sex discrimination, no agitation to or­
dain women as priests, no prostitution. 
Reproduction among the muhans is, as in the case of all living things, achieved 
by simple cell division, the essential difference being that cells from diverse par· 
ents need not be brought into union in order for this division to proceed. The ceils 
all come from one parent-a mode of reproduction perfectly familiar in many other 
animal forms. 
More precisely, each muhan, as it develops, is equipped with a pouch, somewhat 
like that of the hngaroo, and it is 'here that the gei:ieration of the young is achieved. 
After a gestation period of about ten lunar months, the young are delivered into 
the light of day to draw breath and to carry on the life of the species. 
The manner in which such gestation is initiated is straightforward and simple. 
It is achieved by diet. As the muhan attains puberty it becomes susceptible of preg­
nancy by imbibing of a certain fruit, called by the muhans "the fruit of life," and 
also, "the forbidden fruit," and always referred to in grave tones, surrounded, as it 
is, by an aura of mystery. This fruit is indeed, among them, the chief theme of 
poetry, song, story and sometimes humor, though this latter tends to be suppressed, 
surfacing only here and there and often with shame and embarrassment. Such hu­
mor is, for reasons that are unclear, called "off color." 
To taste of the forbidden fruit is considered by these people to be the supreme 
delight, and some psychologists among them consider this to be the motivation, 
however disguised, of virtually all muhan endeavor. For this reason, and because 
of the mysteriousness always associated with it� fairly precise and elaborate cere­
monies have evolved with respect to partaking of this fruit and, needless to say, 
many prohibitions, scrupulously applied and enforced. 
Thus, no muhan is supposed under any circumstances to taste of the fruit until 
he* has attained the age appropriate to bearing young, and not even then until cer-
*Though the muhans are not distinguished as male and female, I shall use the pro­
noun "he" for reasons of style. 
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tain rather rigid and elaborate ceremonial requirements have been met. Each young 
muhan, as he approaches this age, is expected to select one tree from which, even­
tually, to pluck the fruit of life, and then to abide by that tree alone. To pluck the 
fruit of another muhan's tree is strictly forbidden unless, again, certain additional 
ceremonial requirements have first been met. Without these ceremonial prerequi­
sites, such sampling of the fruit of another is deeply resented and severely punished, 
the bond between owner and tree being considered far stronger than mere posses­
sion, being something verging on the sacred. For two muhans simply to exchange 
trees, in search of mere variety of new pleasures, would be for each to risk perma­
nent loss of reputation and all social standing. The merest hints of lapses in this 
area become the subject matter of intense gossip. 
The bond between any muhan and the tree of life which he select.s is the creation 
of the priesthood . Until then it is considered not to exist at all, and from that mo­
ment hence it is considered to be, at least ideally, indissoluble. The manner of its 
creation is quite simple, though very solemn; namely a member of the priesthood 
simply escorts the young muhan to the tree of his choice and, to the accompani­
ment of various gesticulations and utterances and, sometimes, much singing and 
dancing on the part of the attendant muhans, pronounces this muhan to possess 
this tree forever. Then, and then only, can he taste of the fruit; nor, ideally, will 
anyone but he ever taste of it. And normally, the begetting of other muhans follows 
as a natural consequence. 
Inasmuch as all family life, as well as the supremely important life of the species, 
rests upon a highly specialized dietary practice, it is not surprising that a vast num­
ber of prohibitions, injunctions and taboos have arisen and proliferated among the 
muhans, not merely with respect to the tasting of the forbidden fruit, but in rela­
tion to everything having to do with the partaking of any food whatsoever. At the 
heart of all these, however, are all the solemn associations with the forbidden fruit, 
so it is with respect to these that the most stringent prohibitions have arisen, as well 
as the most intense feelings, which are nourished in every way possible, through 
precepts, stories, the invocation of the gods, and the unfaltering instruction of the 
young, particularly by the priesthood. 
For example, the face is almost always concealed by a veil, and the mouth, in 
particular, because of its immediate and direct association with the forbidden fruit, 
is most scrupulously hidden. Of course no one is fooled by this. It is perfectly well 
known by all what lies behind the veil, and the actual functions of those parts 
which are, for decency's sake, withheld from view. Though no muhan would, for 
example, dream of eating anything in public, and would feel deep mortification if 
he were accidentally discovered performing that act, no one for a moment doubts 
that everyone at every level of society, the most exalted as well as the least, does in 
fact eat quite regularly, enjoys eating, and would soon perish otherwise. Nonethe­
less, references to nutrition are always either very sober and more or less clinical in 
character or, at the opposite extreme, excessively vulgar, clothed in a rich vernacu­
lar, and accompanied by much giggling or laugh�er. It is not entirely clear, even to 
the muhans, why this is so. And so far as the actual tasting of the fruit of life is 
concerned, it is perfectly known that this, too, though perhaps sometimes difficult 
to imagine, is in fact a universal practice among adults, for no one is under the 
slightest misconception concerning how the race is begotten. It is further well known 
that this act is quite commonly performed even before it is legitimized by any 
priest, that in fact most muhans have tasted of several, often very many, of the 
fruits of this tree, and even continue to do so after they have been indissolubly and 
exclusively united to one of them. It is, however, the practice of these people not 
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to admit this, at least in their own cases, and to pretend that it in fact does no,t hap­
pen, or at least not among normal and self -respecting muhan beings who have a 
serious regard for basic moral considerations. 
II 
A few more details concerning the moral life of these strange people will emerge 
as we proceed, but we have enough before us now to raise certain questions of 
philosophical significance. And the first and most general is: What shall we rational 
human people say about these strange muhan people and some of their bizarre no­
tions of right and wrong'? And the thing to say is that, from one point of view, 
these people are not in the least strange. They are the mirror images of ourselves! 
Even the dullest and least philosophical person can see that the foregoing story is, 
with only a slight modification of biology, not the imaginative description of some 
purely fabulous race of people, but, with adjustments of detail, the description of 
ourselves. If, accordingly, we can find a rationale to the muhan ethic, then we can 
find, as all moralists have sought to find, a rationale to our own moral life, at least 
within the area of relations of the sexes; but if we can find no such rationale there, 
if the prohibitions of the muhans really are as strange as they first seem, then we 
shall have to draw the same conclusion with respect to our own. And we can then 
raise the larger philosophical question whether all of our ethics is, like our fairly 
fixed and elaborate rules concerning the relations of the sexes, with or without 
some governing rationale; whether, in other words, the ethical prohibitions and in­
junctions that we honor are purely conventional, without any underlying reason 
beyond the fact that we have grown accustomed to them, or whether, on the con­
trary, there are certain rational grounds for our moral life, such that a rationale 
person can see that at least some of our moral ideas are worthy of respect. 
Much turns on these questions, of course. For if our conventional ethics or any 
important part o f  it is rationally groundless, and if, rrroreover, as most philosophical 
people now believe, none of that ethics has been in fact delivered to us by God, 
then we have no reason to take it seriously at all. Just as no muhan people, if there 
were any such, would have any business telling us human people how to live, or 
expecting us to honor their quaint and ridiculous prohibitions surrounding the tak­
ing of food and so on, so also, no human people have any business telling us how to 
live, or expecting us to honor their prohibitions. The mere familiarity of these 
latter, the human prohibitions, and the strangeness of the muhan practices, does 
not make the human ones more rational. It only renders us less critical of them, and 
thus inclined to think that they embody some sort of ethical truth, when in fact 
they may contain none. 
III 
Those are the general questions before us. Now let us try to look behind the 
ethics of our muhan people. Certainly our first and strongest impression is that 
this ethics is rather weird. That any people should surround the actions associated 
with nutrition with all sorts of complex prohibitions and taboos cannot but strike 
us as wildly capricious. That, in fact, the act itself of taking nourishment should be 
associated with the sense of shame or embarrassment, that it should be concealed 
from view, and some sort of pretense kept up that it is not even done, contrary to 
the certain knowledge of everyone, seems so bizarre as to be sjmply perverse, as 
though the very joy of living, and the most basic need of ev�ry living thing, must 
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somehow be connected with wickedness and guilt. All other living things indulge 
this practice unabashedly. It is the most natural thing in the world. Why, then, 
should one species, alone in creation, treat it with such gravity and solemnity? 
And of course at one level the answer to this question is obvious. Nutrition, or 
at least one very limited instance of it, underlies not merely their individual lives, 
but their entire social life, and hence their most basic institutions. To partake of 
the forbidden fruit is a condition necessary, and often sufficient, for the begetting 
of children, hence of perpetuating the race. This is a most awesome consideration. 
The act itself, therefore, cannot be treated lightly. It must be carefully, scrupulous­
ly restricted and enveloped with rules, the conditions for its commission most care­
fully and elaborately defined, and its normal consequences quite rigidly controlled, 
for the good of all. 
And this suggests the sought-for rationale underlying these muhan practices and 
prohibitions; namely, that their moral rules, or at least those under consideration, 
are the product of purely practical considerations. Where behavior has great poten­
tialities for the good or evil of others affected by it, then rules are created in order 
to maximize the possibilities for good or, at least, to minimize the evil. And when 
in addition, as here, there are combined great possibilities for evil in the consequen· 
ces of one's actions, and in addition an overwhelming natural inclination to do 
those actions, then the rules must be both numerous and stringently enforced. For, 
it must be remembered, the tasting of the forbidden fruit is considered by muhans 
to be the ultimate joy, the joy around which many of the others tum. It is the sub· 
ject of much of their poetry and song, and is woven into all their social Jife. And 
at the same time, the effects of indulging this joy are clearly momentous, not 
merely for individuals, but for society. 
It is astonishing how many persons think that this kind of observation, quite 
clearly correct in itself, is an adequate response to the demand for some sort of 
rationale to ethics, as ethics is conceived in our society. Moral rules, they say, are 
not arbitrary prohibitions ami injunctions. They rest upon practical or utilitarian 
considerations. Behavior that is injurious to others is forbidden. Behavior that is 
not is permitted. Behavior that is immensely beneficial is, at least sometimes, re­
quired, by the rules of morality. It wm always be found that this is the case, or at 
least, that it once was. And therefore, we are left to conclude, the rules of morality 
should be heeded. They have their rationale. A rational person can see what this is, 
and also why he, as a rational person, should honor those rules, or in other words, 
why he should be moral. 
But the thing for a philosopher t.o see is that the first part of this claim, that mor­
al rules rest upon a practical foundation, even if  true, does not really support the 
inference we are supposed to draw from it, namely, that we ought, or are somehow 
morally obligated, to honor those rules. It is in fact a shabby argument, which 
could only commend itself to even the most moderate intelligence by the deeply 
felt need to have � sort of justification-any justification-for morality. 
For let us look again at this presumed justification. And to gain some objectivity, 
let us go back to our fabulous people the muhans once more. We said that their 
tasting of the forbidden fruit has enormous social consequences, which might tie 
either very good or·very bad!, and this, we are now to suppose, justifies the complex 
and galling restrictions with which their society envelops this act. But, we should 
now immediately note, it does not at all justify the similarly elaborate and complex 
restrictions and rituals that surround everything connected with nutrition-the sec· 
r e c  y, the veils, the cultivation of shame and embatra!Oment, and so on. For t h e  
consequences o f  these acts, the mere partaking o f  food, are totally good for the in-
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dividual, and indeed essential to his basic well-being, exactly as in the case of human 
people. And we human people go in for none of this system of ritual and taboo, 
nor can we see any reason why we should. All of that considerable part of the mu­
han ethic is, then, entirely groundless. And so, we may infer, is the analogous part 
of our human ethic; namely, that vast area of conduct associated with what we call 
decency and modesty, an area in which the courts of law, the churches, and other 
institutions dedicated to the upholding of moralityare so constantly embroiled. They 
are not, in fact, upholding morality in the least, but are instead enforcing what a 
philosopher can only judge to be an elaborate hoax upon society, something that 
is made worse by their own sense of moral rectitude as they do this. 
But second ,  we can now add a detail to our story of the muhans which will, I 
think, be instructive. For let us suppose that fairly simple ways of avoiding the nor­
mal consequences of eating the forbidden fruit are discovered. We can suppose 
that someone among the muhans has discovered, for example, that if the tree that 
bears this fruit is nourished with a mild hormonal substance, then the capacity of 
its fruit to induce pregnancy is destroyed but without, however, diminishing the 
delight that is associated with tasting the fruit itself. Or we can suppose that the 
muhans discover that the same result is achieved by removing the seeds of the fruit. 
Does the discovery of this result in the rapid evaporation of the muhan morality 
that surrounds nutrition generally and the partaking of the forbidden fruit in par­
ticular? To some slight extent, perhaps; but what mostly happens is that the rules 
are considered still valid, and worthy at least of � heed, so that considerable 
effort is bestowed upon keeping up the appearance of honoring them while in fact, 
out of public view, disregarding them. And, of course, there will be heard among 
the muhans a very loud voice of morality, issuing mostly from the priesthood, 
which will declare it wrong to treat the tree of life with these hormonal substances, 
or to excise the seeds from the fruit. Why? Because the rules of morality are pre­
sumed by them to be valid and worthy of obedience just because they are the rules 
of morality. • 
What, then, can we do with the original "justification" of those rules, which 
consisted of pointing out that they were evolved for the protection of muhan well­
being? A moralist cannot have it both ways. He cannot say, on the one hand, that 
the justification of ethics lies in the minimizing of evil that is achieved by honoring 
its rules, and .then say, aftN other ways have been found of minimizing the same 
evil, that the rules of morality should be heeded just for their own sake. This is 
simply to go around in circles. The moralist, asked for some reason why we should 
heed the rules he holds so dear, triumphantly produces his answer, couched in terms 
of muhan or of human well-being; and then as soon as we describe circumstances 
under which that justification has no relevance, he retreats to the mere declaration 
and iteration of those rules themselves, in grave and unctious tones, getting half the 
race to nod in solemn agreement, not once noticing that, philosophically and ra­
tionally, he has made a complete ass of himself. 
IV 
I want now to enlarge our subject of enquiry, going beyond the narrow sphere 
of morality that involves only the relations of the sexes to consider ethics generally, 
meaning by this, that whole body of rules and prohibitions that govern our con­
duct and are generally considered to be moral imperatives. Have they a justifica­
tion? Or in other words, is there any reason to honor and heed them, apart from 
the disapproval and perhaps the pain and deprivation that our fellow men will in-
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flict upon us in case we do not? Is fear the only ground for such obedience to moral 
rule, or is there some other justification which a rational person can discover? Can 
a philosopher somehow show that we should conform our conduct to at least some 
of the most fundamental rules of morality, or must he be content, as most persons 
are, with solemn declamation, like a preacher, perhaps to the accompaniment of a 
demeanor of outward reverance, intonation, or perhaps solemn music or the sym­
bolic artifacts of reli_gion? Of those rules of the muhan people that we have been 
examining, it would be appropriate to say that they are merely muhan, all too mu­
han. Is it similarly true of our rules-all of them-that they are merely human, all 
too human? 
·Let us see more precisely what this question means. To say of morality that it is 
merely human is to make a point that was often made by some of the sophists of 
antiquity. That is, these thinkers, or some of them, declared that morality is merely 
a matter of convention, that its rules are all manmade, that they are the deliverance 
neither of the gods, nature, nor human reason. Throughout the centuries· since then, 
the Church has of course emphatically denied this, claiming that there is a true mor­
ality that has been delivered by God to His creatures, through Moses and others, 
and that it can be found in holy scripture. I shall not be concerned with this opin­
ion, since it has nothing whatsoever to do with philosophy. 
But the ancient claim of the sophists has also been denied by virtually every 
philosopher of stature, beginning with Socrates, even without appealing to any claim 
of religion. For it has been the contention of most philosophical moralists that 
there is some true principle of right and wrong, discoverable by reason, such that a 
rational person can see, not only what he is expected by others to do, but what he 
morally ought to do. Philosophers have not, to !be sure, spoken with one voice in 
this matter-a consideration which the partisans of religion have cited as showing 
the superiority of their own claims , but most philosophers have at least agreed that 
their common quest was intelligible and capable of fulfillment. They have assumed, 
in other words, that there is such a thing as philosophical ethics, that there is truth 
in this realm as in others, and that the task was simply to find it. And our question 
now is whether they are right. We do not ask here, then, what is morally right or 
wrong, but rather, whether there is any such thing as philosophical ethics at all, or 
in other words, whether there is any rational basis to morality to begin with, or 
whether, on the other hand, all this must be leftt to a priesthood, or to the whim 
and caprice of the unphilosophical mass of mankind. 
With respect to those systems of philosophical ethics that so many thinkers since 
Socrates have so busily contrived, there are two things that strike our attention. 
One is their considerable diversity, and the other is the manner in which the basic 
content of this or that system quite faithfully reflects the inherited mores and ta­
boos of the group to which its inventor happens to belong. 
Thus, to remind you of something with which you are already fairly familiar, 
Callicles declared the true or natural morality to rest upon the inherent right of the 
superior man to rule and enslave his inferiors- a theory for which he was able to 
make a strong case. Socrates, on the other hand, having been taught to \g}fmte 
reason, therewith "discovered" that right conduct is that which is rational and in­
formed, that the wrong-doer is simply him who is ignorant-a notion that has al· 
ways charmed philosophy, in spite of its almost glaring arbitrariness. This infatua­
tion with the alleged "rational faculty" having been then nourished and perpet­
uated by every generation of philosophy, including our own, it being the basic pre­
occupation of philosophers, it is not surprising that most ethical systems have ap­
pealed to it, not merely to confirm their fond notions, but as embodying the ulti-
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mate goodness. Thus Plato discovered that a good man is nothing but one whose life 
is governed by reason, and a bad man one governed by desire-a quaint notion to 
which many still nod uncritical approval. Aristotle, when he turned from the an­
alysis of the conventional or what is happily termed the "vulgar" ethics of his non· 
philosophical contemporaries to the true ethics of the philosopher, said about the 
same thing. Indeed, he even declared this preciouc reason to be that in man which 
�ost closely approaches the divine. The Stoics echoed all this, declaring the rational 
soul to be, if properly tended by its possessor, incorruptible by any combined as­
sault of man and nature. Kant continued in the same tradition, finding in reason a 
unique, supreme and immeasurable worth, which governs the conduct of the mor­
ally right man, but is governed by feelings in him whose conduct lacks this recti­
tude-exactly as Plato had said. But Kant took an additional step, thereby endearing 
himself to every philosopher acculturated by the Judeo-Christian tradition, by "dis· 
covering" that this rational faculty issues commands or imperatives, and one such 
supreme command that is not merely inspiring, but one that is binding on every 
rational being. Thus was he able not merely to perpetuate the ages-old fondness for 
a nebulous faculty of reason, but, along with this, elevate it to the place of al­
mighty God, who had hitherto been thought by the masses to be the source of such 
moral commands, binding on all. And even philosophers whom we have been taught 
to th ink of as opposed to these philosophical traditions can nevertheless be seen 
to be deeply immersed in them, such that their philosophical ethics are, like these, 
no more than the reflections of those traditional habits of thought. J.S. Mm, for 
example, is often thought of as opposing the Kantian approach. But did he not 
also assume, entirely uncritica1ly, that there is a true principle of right and wrong, 
and that it is discoverable by reason? Did he not think, as Kant did, that reason 
(and hence philosophy) can enunciate a moral law which all persons are morally 
bound to heed? And did he not believe that this law could replace the traditional 
commandments of God, if inde�d, these latter were not merely the reflection of 
that law? 
We cannot here review the whole history of philosophical ethics, and there is no 
need to go into it further. The point is already clear, I think, that philosophers, in 
elaborating their own ethical schemes, really do no more than articulate certain 
values that they imbibe from their own culture or group. Their theories are totally 
arbitrary, not the least less whimsical than the strange and amusing prejudices and 
taboos of the muhans. We can, to be sure, declare with much truth that the basic 
moral prohibitions and injunctions that we have inherited, not from philosophy, 
but from our Judeo-Christian culture, have or at least once had practical value, 
that they tend to promote the good and lessen the evil for society as a whole. That 
is a sociological observation, and a rather trite one. But from that we can derive no 
philosophical truth, no moral obligation to heed those prohibitions and injunctions. 
Certainly we can derive no philosophical ethics at all. All we can get from it is an 
understanding of why we should be exhorted from every side to honor those inher­
ited rules, and even, perhaps, why we should' be expected to continue to do so when 
that practical foundation becomes inoperative. The muhans, we saw, were expected 
to conform to the ritualistic and ceremonial requirements surrounding the forbid­
den fruit, and nutrition generally, even when there had ceased to be any real reason 
to do so. And we can understand this, in a way. That is the way people are. They 
become acculturated to certain ways of behaving., and feel discomfort at departures 
from these, even when the ground for conformity has vanished. It is only muhan, 
all too muhan. And it is the same with us. It is only human. When the basis o f  our 
rule-governed behavior has vanished, then we still feel the need for rules. And phil-
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osophers are always at hand to contrive some sort of "rational" justification for 
what we feel that need for-a justification that will find wide acceptance, not be· 
cause it has even a trace of rational foundation, but because the acceptance has al­
ready been made in our feelings. 
v 
I now want to pull together these reflections, in the form of a conclusion. And 
that conclusion can rest on what seems to me a most evident truth ; namely, that 
what one human being ordains, another can disregard, unless the ordinance of the 
first rests upon something � than his inherited prejudices. And that "something 
more" cannot be, as every philosophical ethics I know of is, a mere elaboration and 
rationalization of those prejudices. No muhan, to revert once more to these people, 
has the slightest moral obligation to conform to the rituals and taboos connected 
with nutrition, merely because some other muhan, or even a whole society of them, 
bids him to. Nor does it matter if this muhan is a priest, or a philosopher, unless, of 
course, the priest derives his rules from God, or the philosopher derives them from 
reason. And so it is with us. No priest can instruct my conduct, unless he speaks 
for God, as I believe he does not, nor can any philosopher do the same, unless he 
can show that the rules or imperatives he sets forth are the deliverance of his and 
� reason, as I am quite sure they are not. 
Now of course there does remain one possibility that we must consider, and that 
is, that there perhaps is some true or valid set of moral principles; that is, some ethic 
that does not rest merely upon practical considerations of what does and does not 
advance human welfare, and which is not merely the distillation of our inherited 
codes and prohibitions. And perhaps, indeed, there is, and that someday it will be 
known-though I must confess that this strikes me as one of those far-fetched possi­
bilities that only a philosopher could think of, and could take seriously only be­
cause it is a mere possibility, not something drawn from actual experience. But if 
we do take this possibility seriously, then there is another we must take equally 
seriously; namely, that this system of true morality, when discovered, might be 
totally at odds with what we now think of as morality, or that, in other words, we 
might wake up to discover, to our consternation, that our inherited ethics is in fact 
a system of immorality. A few philosophers have even entertained this possibility. 
Nietzsche is often thought of as one. Callicles, if he can be called a philosopher, is 
certainly another, for he thought that the true or natural ethics is in fact opposed to 
our comfortable ethics of equality and the restraint of the superior. 
To understand the possibility that is here being suggested, consider this. What if, 
in ages past, certain nature philosophers had undertaken to ordain some system of, 
say, chemistry, finding the materials for this in the inherited prejudices of their 
traditions. Some alchemists. did, in fact, come rather close to doing this. What they 
mainly lacked · was a priesthood and a legislature, having powers of enforcement, 
capable of imposing such a system of chemistry on the rest of society. But now the 
question arises: What if such a system had been efaborated, and imposed on entire 
cultures, with the help of a priesthood and government? What would be the likeli­
hood that such a system would then eventually be vindicated by the actual science 
of chemistry that has been built up, under the guidance of experiment, observation 
and reason? The likelihood of such coinciden�e is, of course, small indeed. The true 
science of the elements has turned out to be quite utterly different than what any­
one could have dreamed, or what some of the alchemists and nature philosophers 
did dream, in earlier ages. Is there any reason to suppose that a true system of eth-
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ics, in case this is not a mere chimera to begin with, would ever coincide with or 
resemble the ethics which priests and moral philosophers have invented and, with 
the support of both law and religion, grafted onto our culture from one generation 
to another? Who can know, for example, that a true morality would represent all 
men as in any sense equal, that it would not hold it a duty sometimes to take hu­
man life, wilfully and deliberately, or that it would protect the weak? The plain 
fact is that no one knows what a true system of ethics would enjoin. One can rea­
sonably doubt that any such system exists to be discovered. But one can, I think, 
be fairly sure that, if it does, there is no basis whatsoever for supposing that it re­
sembles the utterly human ethics we have inherited from distant ages, spun out of 
thin ait in response to the felt needs of sometimes beleaguered cultures, and then 
imposed by the help of law and religion, until, at last, the basic principles of this 
human ethics seems to us, and even to many philosophers, to be the very deliver· 
ance of reason. 
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